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Abstract: We investigate the effects of market fragmentation and information flows in the case of stocks
cross-listed on markets in Central Europe and London. First, we test for co-movement, interaction and error
correction behavior between the local and London markets. Our results suggest that strong interactions
exist between these markets, with the London market being slightly more important than the local one.
The two prices of cross-listed stocks are cointegrated and pricing errors are corrected over a few days.
These interactions suggest partial fragmentation. Second, we extend an earlier model to examine the impact
of foreign listing on the variance of local returns. The focus of previous studies has concentrated almost
exclusively on the return of cross-listed securities. The variance of returns has remained mostly unnoticed,
even though some studies noted an increase of variance after the cross-listing. In our model, we introduce a
new factor that influences return variance: tighter interaction with foreign markets as a consequence of
cross-listing. Estimation results lend support to our model.
Abstrakt: ZkoumÆme dopady fragmentace trhů a informačn￿ch toků v př￿padě akci￿ duÆlně
obchodovan￿ch na trz￿ch ve středn￿ Evropě a v Lond￿ně. V prvn￿ čÆsti člÆnku testujeme, do jakØ m￿ry se
ceny na lokÆln￿m a lond￿nskØm trhu pohybuj￿ společně, zda jsou integrovanØ, popř￿padě zda existuje
mechanismus napravovÆn￿ chyb. Na￿e v￿sledky ukazuj￿, ￿e mezi těmito trhy existuj￿ silnØ interakce a ￿e
lond￿nsk￿ trh je m￿rně důle￿itěj￿￿. Ceny na domÆc￿m a lond￿nskØm trhu jsou kointegrovÆny a chyby v
oceněn￿ jsou napraveny v průběhu několika dn￿. Tyto interakce naznačuj￿ čÆstečnou fragmentaci trhů. Ve
druhØ čÆsti jsme roz￿￿řili dř￿věj￿￿ model, abychom mohli zkoumat dopad duÆln￿ho obchodovÆn￿ akci￿ na
variabilitu jejich domÆc￿ch cen. Předchoz￿ studie se toti￿ zaměřovaly tØměř v￿lučně na v￿nos duÆlně
obchodovan￿ch akci￿, zat￿mco variabilita v￿nosů zůstÆvala vět￿inou nepov￿imnuta, i kdy￿ některØ studie
upozornily na vy￿￿￿ variabilitu na domÆc￿m trhu po zaveden￿ duÆln￿ho obchodovÆn￿. V na￿em modelu
zavÆd￿me nov￿ faktor, kter￿ vysvětluje variabilitu v￿nosů ￿ těsněj￿￿ interakci se zahraničn￿mi trhy jako
důsledek duÆln￿ho obchodovÆn￿. V￿sledky odhadů podporuj￿ nÆ￿ model.
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1.  Introduction
Cross-listing of securities has been increasingly popular in recent decades, with the
number of ADR and GDR issues increasing rapidly. Indeed, even firms from transition
economies with limited equity market experience have introduced their stock to the
international equity markets in London or New York. With the growing popularity of
cross-listing in financial markets, economic literature has started to pay closer attention to
this phenomenon.
2
The majority of previous studies have concentrated on the excess return connected with
cross-listing. The second most important characteristic of a stock, its risk as measured by
return variance, has been largely neglected. The present paper attempts to fill this gap.
First, we investigate the information flows between markets for cross-listed securities and
the degree of integration of the local and foreign markets. Second, we turn to the problem
of local-return volatility. We extend an earlier model of Domowitz et al. (1998) and
estimate it using data on stocks from Central Europe that are cross-listed on the London
Stock Exchange. We explicitly include pricing errors between the local and London
markets as a factor influencing the beliefs of market participants. Approximately half of
the stocks in our sample allow us to estimate the effects of cross-listing directly, in an
event-study manner; for the rest we estimate a simplified version of the model.
                                                
2 For instance, over 115 depositary receipt programs, from over 30 countries, are listed on the London
Stock Exchange.3
In the first step of our analysis, we attempt to determine whether and to what extent the
information flows between local and foreign markets are important. For this purpose, we
use the Granger causality framework and a cointegration/error-correction approach.
By estimating these models we are, in fact, testing whether the two markets are integrated
or fragmented. If the markets are integrated, in effect it is only one market with two
trading venues, there will be only one price of two virtually identical assets (the payoffs
of the stock and the GDR are basically the same). Of course, this does not mean that
random fluctuations of the two prices cannot exist, creating temporary price differences.
In an integrated market setting, however, such price differences should not exhibit any
systematic pattern and should be quickly corrected ￿ mostly during the same trading day.
Systematic patterns in daily data suggest that the markets are fragmented.
A related question, which we also address and which is important for the second step in
our analysis, is whether either of the markets dominates the other in terms of new
information discovery. The local market might have superior access to information about
local firms, at least in terms of timing, but the foreign markets are more developed and
much more capitalized and thus theoretically their shocks might spill over to the local
markets. Another related question is whether profitable arbitrage opportunities exist and,
if they do, how quickly they are corrected.
In the second step, we focus on the return volatility of cross-listed stocks. As already
mentioned, few of the studies that dealt with cross-listed shares explicitly examine the
behavior of return variance. Most recently, Domowitz et al. (1998) and Foerster and
Karolyi (1999) report that the variance of returns increased after the cross listing. In our
view, which we formalize and explore in this paper, return variance of cross-listed4
securities on a partially fragmented market can be decomposed into three components.
3
The first is the baseline volatility, which is determined by the realization of new
information and market frictions unrelated to the other two factors. The second is the
magnitude and characteristics of order flow (or, in other words, liquidity) and the third is
foreign market volatility. This third factor is transferred to the local price of the cross-
listed security through pricing errors and utilization of arbitrage opportunities by
investors. The  first two factors were examined by Domowitz et al. (1998) using data on
Mexican equities; however, these two factors did not explain the increase of variance
after GDR listing.
We use data on stocks from three markets in Central European countries in transition.
Emerging capital markets in transition economies are often flawed by problems of low
liquidity, insufficient regulation or market fragility. These problems are arguably more
serious compared with those in other emerging markets that have developed over a longer
time period (for instance, in Mexico). Since we explore the impact of market
fragmentation, these markets appear to be more suitable for our analysis than other, more
advanced, emerging markets and certainly are more suitable than developed markets. It is
also advantageous to use stocks from three different markets, even though international
portfolio investors often perceive them as being one regional market. The capital markets
in these three countries have experienced quite different development over the past ten
                                                
3 Since ideal markets do not exist in the real world, all real data will come from markets that are at least
slightly fragmented. It is thus somewhat surprising that Domowitz et al. (1998) attempt to test for market
integration when they were unable to obtain price information from both local and foreign markets for the
stocks in their sample. It appears unlikely for two markets to be integrated when prices from one of the
markets are not easily available to a large population of market participants.5
years and have different structures. Using data from three countries thus allows us to
lower any potential flaw caused by idiosyncratic features.
We bring evidence from three emerging capital markets (the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland), whereas most previous studies on cross-listing dealt with developed markets
(U.S., U.K., Canada, and Japan), which are large and liquid.
4 All three countries, though
to different degrees, have significantly relied on foreign investors to finance the transition
toward a market economy. On the part of foreign investors there has been substantial
interest, primarily because the three countries are the most developed among the
transition countries, are now members of NATO and are viewed as being on the fast track
for EU membership. It should come as no surprise then that foreign investors have played
an important role in these capital markets.
As for related literature, the study by Domowitz et al. (1998) is most closely related to
ours. Domowitz et al. investigated the effect of order flow migration using data on
Mexican shares. They showed that the effect of cross-listing depends on the quality of
inter-market information linkages. On one hand the domestic market experiences order
flow migration to the foreign market where the stocks are newly listed, but on the other
hand, cross-listing could improve market quality in terms of spreads, precision of public
information and overall liquidity of the stock. The realization of these benefits, however,
hinges on the degree of integration of the two capital markets. Domowitz et al. deal with
order flow migration, but they do not recognize that foreign market volatility becomes a
stronger factor influencing local market volatility when local shares are cross-listed
abroad. We extend their work to explicitly include the volatility of prices on the foreign6
market by considering the reaction of market participants to pricing errors. As we have
already mentioned, Domowitz et al. found that volatility increased after international
cross-listing. Indeed, virtually all the securities they study experienced a rise in volatility
after the cross-listing and they are not able to explain this rise by liquidity changes.
5
One of the earliest relevant studies on dually listed stocks dates back to the late seventies
and was authored by Garbade and Silber (1979), who analyzed the short-run behavior of
dually listed equities, that is, stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the
regional stock exchanges. These authors introduced the concept of dominant and satellite
markets. If a particular security is traded on two markets, say A and B, under imperfect
market integration the price adjustment can be characterized in two ways. First, the
adjustment to mispricing might be symmetric, that is, the speed of adjustment of prices in
market A is the same as the speed of adjustment of prices in market B. On the other hand,
prices in one market (for instance A) may usually or always adjust to prices in the other
market (B); then, market B is dominant and market A behaves like a satellite.
Lieberman, Ben-Zion and Hauser (1999) examine the price behavior of stocks dually
listed in Israel and the U.S. by using an error-correction approach. The authors found that
the price time series of dually listed securities are cointegrated, arbitrage opportunities
are generally not available, and the domestic market mostly emerges as dominant, while
the foreign market behaves like a satellite. Hauser, Tanchuma and Yaari (1998) used data
on several stocks listed on both the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ in order
to investigate the information transmission between these two markets. Two alternative
                                                                                                                                                
4 Wahab et al. (1992), Kato et al. (1991) or Werner and Kleidon (1996) to name just a few.7
tests for causality, both based in essence on the Granger (1969) idea were used. Their
conclusion was that the price causality is unidirectional from the domestic market to the
foreign market. Murphy and Sabov (1995) explored the pricing of Hungarian stocks
unofficially quoted in Vienna. Their study uses data from a truly embryonic phase of the
development of Hungarian capital markets and thus their results cannot be directly
compared to ours.
As mentioned earlier, there exists a rather rich literature dealing with the impact of cross-
listing on the (required) return of a stock. Theoretical models, for instance Alexander et
al. (1987), suggest that cross-listing should lead to temporary excess returns, which are
justified by the fact that cross-listing removes existing market segmentation. Empirical
results, however, have not been completely persuasive. Domowitz et al. (1995) found that
excess returns are insignificant around the GDR (ADR) listing, while Jayaraman (1993)
found significant gains only for Japanese firms. Alexander et al. (1988) found positive
abnormal returns prior to the cross-listing, but they also observed negative returns after
the cross-listing. More recently, Miller (1999) examined the stock price reaction to
international dual stock listing across a broad sample of countries and focused on the date
of the dual-listing announcement rather than the actual listing date. His findings suggest
that the excess returns are indeed significant.
Overall, theoretical studies suggest that the cross-listing will lead to excess returns if the
two markets are not integrated. However, there are also possible drawbacks, which arise
when the two markets are fragmented, i.e., pricing information is not readily available or
                                                                                                                                                
5 Domowitz et al. (1998) also cite other studies which document an increase in return variance following
international cross listing: Jayaraman et al. (1993) and Karolyi (1996).8
there are other barriers to transfer of information. Then, order migration might decrease
local market quality as suggested by Domowitz et al. (1998). Moreover, as we suggest,
the transfer of foreign market volatility might increase the volatility of local returns. This
might be particularly important in the case of emerging markets with relatively low
liquidity that tend to be vulnerable to transfer of fluctuations from developed markets.
To sum up, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we use Granger causality and
cointegration/error-correction models to draw conclusions about market integration or
fragmentation.
6 Second, we extend the Domowitz et al. (1998) model to include the
effects of foreign market volatility and focus on the variability of local returns after GDR
listing. Third, we are using data from three emerging markets, for which the above-
mentioned volatility and order migration effects should be important. Such data has not
been used previously, as most previous papers dealt with developed markets.
2.  Data Description
We use data from three equity markets in Central Europe: the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland. The Czech Republic employed coupon privatization when privatizing large
firms, which led to widely dispersed ownership of shares and fast development of the
equity market, at least in terms of market capitalization and the number of traded shares.
The regulation of the market and especially the protection of minority shareholder rights
lagged significantly behind. Investor confidence was damaged by several cases of fraud
and the Czech capital market gradually came to be regarded as an insider market. Since
many shareholders who received shares in coupon privatization sold out and there have9
been neither strong domestic institutional players nor broad small-shareholder
participation, the Czech market has been to a large extent dependent on foreign investors.
Poland took a different approach. It started with strict regulation and a small number of
companies on the stock exchange, but the market developed rather rapidly and attracted a
number of initial public offerings. Also, Poland became to a large extent a retail market,
with a large number of small shareholders. Hungary sold a large number of its large firms
to foreign investors, which improved its business climate significantly. The number of
firms on the exchange was smaller compared to the Czech Republic, but the investment
sentiment was better also, because international investors trusted the foreign owners of
companies whose shares were traded on the exchange.
The different levels of capital market regulation, combined with differences in economic
development, led to a very large variation in returns of the three markets. In early June
1994, when our sample starts, the Czech market index PX-50 stood at approximately 650
points. Six years later, in mid-2000, it was actually lower, at 580. The Polish index
WIG20 performed considerably better, as it grew from approximately 1,000 points in
early June 1994 to approximately 2,000 points in June 2000. The Hungarian index BUX
jumped from 1,600 points to some 9,000 points over the same time period.
7
In our sample, there are 3 companies from the Czech Republic, 10 companies from
Hungary and 9 companies from Poland. All of these have their stocks dually listed on the
                                                                                                                                                
6 To our knowledge, these models have not been used in this way previously.
7 All three indices are weighted by market capitalization. Hungary and Poland experienced higher inflation
than the Czech Republic during the mentioned time period, but this does not explain the difference in index
returns. If we take into account the development of consumer inflation since 1994, the PX-50 fell to 400
points, the WIG20 index stayed virtually flat at 975 points and the BUX index increased to 3,830 points.10
local market and in London (at the London Stock Exchange) in the form of Global
Depositary Receipts (GDR).
8 Basic information is depicted in Table 1.
<Table 1 can be found in the Appendix>
Table 1 reveals that the companies come from a rather diverse range of industries ￿ from
financial services like banking or leasing to metal and miscellaneous production.
The companies are diverse also in terms of their market capitalization, which varies from
just over 30 million USD for Polish Mostostal to almost 10 billion USD in the case of
Polish telecom. In fact, telecom companies in all three countries are the most capitalized
in both relative (compared to other stocks in the country) and absolute (compared to all
stocks in our sample) terms. The average market capitalization stands at 1.4 billion USD.
The stocks are diverse also in terms of the length of time of the GDR listing and the way
they were introduced to the capital market. The stock of some companies was put on the
capital market as a result of coupon privatization (for instance Komerčn￿ banka or Česk￿
Telecom) while other companies were introduced on the market as IPOs rather recently
(e.g. Agora or Europejski Fundusz Leasingowy). In some of these cases, the stock was
introduced simultaneously to the local and London markets, which prevents us from
performing an analysis of the impact of cross-listing ￿ the pre-GDR data simply does not
exist. In other cases, even though the stock traded on the local market prior to its
introduction to London, the time series prior to cross-listing are too short for us to be able
                                                
8 A number of shares from the three countries are also listed on stock exchanges in Germany and Austria.
However, the liquidity on these exchanges is too low for us to use the prices for estimation. One of the
problems is that with low liquidity it might not be profitable for investors to engage in arbitrage between
the markets as long as the price difference is not very large. Also, London is more important as a financial
center than Frankfurt or Vienna and the shocks from developed markets are arguably more visible there
compared with Frankfurt or Vienna. Moreover, most international investors and brokers that are active in
Central Europe are based in London.11
to analyze the impact of cross-listing. Overall, we have 10 stocks out of the total 22 for
which data is available both before and after the cross-listing.
9 On average, then, we have
984 days of local trading and 693 days of GDR trading for each stock. Komerčn￿ banka
started to trade the earliest on its local market, in June 1993, while Europejski Fundusz
Leasingowy has been floated most recently, in March 2000.
The shares of the companies in our sample are traded on the local stock exchanges in
Prague, Budapest and Warsaw. All three exchanges are relatively modern in that they
rely on computer networks as the means of communication during trading. The role of
physical presence of traders on the floor and open outcry auction has been eliminated.
On the Prague Stock Exchange, the most important change occurred in May 1998, when
a system of market-makers who quote firm prices for the most liquid shares was created
(all 3 Czech stocks in our sample qualify as being among the most liquid and are thus
traded in this system).
10 In Budapest, a new computerized trading system that allows
remote access of traders was introduced in 1998. The system, which operates without a
market maker or specialist, has two phases: a single price auction and a continuous
auction. All the Hungarian stocks in our sample are included in the highest market
category (A).
11 In Warsaw, there are also two trading systems: single price auction (batch
auction) and continuous trading. There is a specialist, but his function is to a large extent
                                                
9 For the remaining 12 stocks, we estimate a simplified model.
10 The Prague Stock Exchange has, in fact, three different trading systems and shares are divided into
groups according to their liquidity. The least liquid shares are traded only in a batch auction (single price).
For more liquid shares, the batch auction is followed by continuous trading and the most liquid shares are
traded in the market-maker system.
11 In this category, the listing requirements call for the company￿s market capitalization to exceed 10 billion
HUF (roughly 35 million USD). In addition, the number of shareholders should be greater than 1,000, the
company must have at least 3 completed and audited business years and the most recently audited business
year must show profit.12
administrative; he determines the price in the batch auction in accordance with pre-set
rules.
12 The specialist may balance the order flow by trading on his own account, but he
is not obliged to quote firm prices. The division of shares into trading groups is, again,
driven by their liquidity. The most liquid shares started to be gradually included in
continuous trading in the second half of 1996.
13 All the Polish shares in our sample trade
continuously.
As for the London trading venue, GDRs on the shares are traded on the international
segment of the London Stock Exchange (also known as SEAQ International). In this
system, market makers key their bid and offer prices directly into the central computer
system and investors contact the market makers by telephone to execute a trade. As for
the settlement and transfer, once the investor and market maker execute their trade, they
decide when settlement will take place. The GDRs are depositary receipts denominated in
U.S. dollars and issued by a bank (in our sample, most often by the Bank of New York)
that holds the underlying shares. The depositary takes care of voting at the general
meetings, dividend payments, etc. All the GDRs are company-sponsored, which means
that the company itself contracted the depositary to perform the depositary services. Most
of the GDRs in our sample are so-called REG S shares, which means that they are to be
traded only by qualified institutional investors.
                                                
12 The price-setting rules in the batch auctions are very similar across the three markets. Given the
submitted orders, the aim is to maximize the trading volume, minimize the excess supply or demand, and
minimize the price change from the previous trading session.
13 By the end of 1999, shares of 99 companies were being traded continuously.  Trading units in continuous
trading (lots) usually have the value of several thousand zloty (1 USD = roughly 4 zloty). They are thus
smaller than the lots in the Czech market-maker system (there, trading units average around 50 thousand
USD).13
Since we are exploring the information flows between the local and London markets, it is
important to measure the prices simultaneously. Otherwise, any results suggesting the
existence of information flows between markets might be caused simply by the fact that
prices are measured at different times during the trading day.
14 For instance, if markets in
Central Europe closed prior to the London market, new information might appear during
the time when only the London market was in operation. Estimation results might then
suggest that the local markets follow the movement of the London market, even though
there is no such process in reality. Fortunately, this is not a serious problem in our case.
Even though quotations can be inserted into the SEAQ-I system from 7:30 to 17:15 GMT
(which is 8:30￿18:15 local time in the three countries under consideration) and trading
ends between 16:00 and 16:30 at the local exchanges, our London closing prices are
recorded at the time of local market close.
3.  Information Links Between Markets
3.1. Models
As the first step in our inquiry about the role of information flows and local market
volatility, we estimate two models: Granger causality and cointegration/error-correction
models. These should help us determine whether the two markets, local and London, are
integrated or fragmented.
                                                
14 I would like to thank Randall Filer for bringing this point to my attention.14
3.1.1. Information Flows: Granger Causality
First, we estimate the Granger causality model in order to find out what the direction of
information flows is and whether any market, local or London, can be viewed as
dominant in terms of information discovery. In fact, both could play the role of a
dominant market. The domestic market is closer to the sources of information about the
companies, but foreign investors are important players on the local markets and might
react to the development of global capital markets and thus influence the local market.
The model is in the usual Granger (1969) causality framework, which allows us to
examine the co-movements of two time series. One time series is regressed on its own
lagged values and on the lagged values of the other time series. In general, if we denote
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We say that x Granger-causes y if the lagged values of x in the regression of y on lagged
y and x are statistically significant. This means that lagged values of x contain relevant
information for the current value of y. In our specification, we test whether the
coefficients  γ are jointly significantly different from zero, and symmetrically for the
hypothesis that y Granger-causes x. Overall, we can find four possible outcomes: two
cases of unidirectional causality (x causing y or y causing x but not vice versa), no
causality, and causality running both ways. In our specific case, the two time series are15
the returns of the local stock and its GDR (converted to be expressed in terms of one
currency, at the current market exchange rate).
Returns are computed as percentage price changes. We can thus have causality (and
information) flowing from the local market to London only or vice versa. The other two
possibilities are either causality in both directions (then we cannot say what market is
dominant) or no causality. It should be noted that the evidence of causality in either or
both directions suggests that the markets are fragmented. This is due to the fact that we
use daily data and we would expect the pricing differences to disappear quickly. In the
no-causality case, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the markets are integrated and that
new information is compounded into prices simultaneously at the two trading venues.
However, it might also be the case that the two price series are unrelated. This possibility
is addressed in the following sub-section, where we test the cointegration of the two time
series and estimate an error-correction model.
We use the basic OLS estimator, but with a correction for heteroscedasticity; stock price
time series, similarly to many other financial time series, are known to be prone to
changing variance.
15 We use the standard White (1980) approach. In order to test for the
joint significance of the lagged terms, we use the usual F-test, that is, we test the
restriction that the coefficients of the lagged terms are jointly equal to zero.
16 The optimal
number of lags (p) was determined according to the standard Akaike and Schwarz Bayes
Information Criteria.
                                                
15 Below, we show that there are no unit roots in the return time series (as opposed to time series of prices)
and we can therefore use the OLS estimator.
16 It should be noted that as the standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, the F-test is not valid
strictly.16
3.1.2. Existence and Persistence of Arbitrage Opportunities: an Error Correction
Approach
In this section, we inquire into the existence of arbitrage opportunities and their
persistence. First we create the mispricing series ￿ that is, the difference between the
price on the local market and in London ￿ and compute its basic statistical properties. We
use the current market exchange rate to make prices on the two markets comparable.
Then we test for the level of integration of the price time series. We need to ascertain the
degree of integration in order to proceed with the cointegration and error-correction
models. In our case, one would expect (and this indeed turns out to be the case) that the
price time series will not be stationary but their first differences will be stationary. This
means that the domestic and foreign prices are both integrated of the order I(1). We use
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test in order to test for the degree of time series












and testing whether the coefficient γ is significantly different from zero. The null
hypothesis is that this coefficient equals zero, which means that there is a unit root in the
time series y. Rejecting the null hypothesis allows us to conclude that the time series is
stationary.
17
                                                
17 Also when conducting the ADF test, the optimal number of augmenting lags (p) was determined
according to the Akaike and Schwarz Bayes Information Criteria. We also considered the significance of
the individual coefficients when deciding about the lag length.17
After testing stationarity, we proceed to estimate the possible cointegration relationship
between the local and London prices and based on the results, we formulate the error-
correction model. First we estimate the cointegration regressions:
lt = α 1UKt + εt (3)
and
UKt = β1lt + ξt (4)
where l and UK stand for the prices on the local and London markets. We then test for
stationarity of the residuals from the regressions by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test again. If we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals from the
above regressions, that is, if the residuals are I(0), we can conclude that the time series
are cointegrated. The coefficients α 1 and β1 express the equilibrium relationship between
the two variables and can be used to formulate the error-correction model.
One would expect, naturally, that the two prices should be the same (after all, the two
securities are virtually identical), so the coefficients α 1 and β1 would be equal to one and
the difference in prices would then be the error (the deviation from the long-term
equilibrium relationship). We estimate both variants of the error-correction model, the
local return as dependent variable
∆Lt = λ(α 1UKt-1 ￿ Lt-1) + δ1∆UKt + π1∆IXLt + εt (5)
and the London (GDR) return as the dependent variable
∆ UKt = θ(β1Lt-1 ￿ UKt-1) + δ2∆Lt + π 2∆IXUKt + ξt (6)
where IXL and IXUK stand for the market index in the local capital market and in
London. We generally use the most widely quoted indices, which all employ market18
capitalization weighting: PX-50 for the Czech Republic, BUX for Hungary, WIG20 for
Poland and FTSE100 for the U.K. market. The two parameters of primary interest (λ and
θ) are those at the error term. These parameters reveal the way the time series react to the
short-term deviations from the long-term equilibrium relationship. Market efficiency and
the no-arbitrage theorem do not exclude the possibility that random factors cause the two
time series to diverge from their equilibrium relationship. Such random fluctuations,
however, should be quickly corrected by arbitrage. Thus, arbitrage opportunities might
exist, but they should not persist over a long period of time. The fact that we allow the
error-correction coefficients (λ and θ) to be different also offers an insight into the
dominant-satellite relationship between the two markets. If a mispricing arises, the
satellite market would be expected to move faster toward the price on the other market
than vice versa.
We use the OLS estimator for testing the unit roots and cointegration. For the error-
correction model, we use the White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator again.
It should be noted that we faced the endogeneity problem when estimating the error-
correction model in both directions ￿ equations (5) and (6) form, in fact, a system of
equations. We had to instrument for the contemporaneous price change on the other
market [∆UKt in equation (5) and ∆Lt in equation (6)] by its lagged value and by the
change in the market index on the same market [∆IXUKt in equation (5) and ∆IXLt in
equation (6)].19
3.2. Estimation Results
3.2.1. Results of Granger Causality Estimation
We estimated the Granger causality model with different lag lengths (from 1 to 6) and, as
already mentioned above, used the Akaike and Schwarz Bayes Information Criteria when
choosing the optimal number of lags. The optimal number of lags varied between 2 and 6
for individual stocks, with 3 and 4 being the most frequent lag length. However, our
results were not sensitive to the specification of the model.
<Table 2 can be found in the Appendix>
The results suggest that there exist strong information flows between the local and
London markets. In most instances we were able to reject the null hypothesis of no
Granger causality. In fact, we were able to reject the null hypothesis in 20 out of the 22
instances for London to local market causality and in 14 out of the 22 instances for the
causality from local market to London. Moreover, most of the rejections were at the 1%
significance level. Overall, we found that in approximately half of the cases (12 out of
22), the causality ran in both directions; the London market appears to be more important
on the whole, even though there are instances in which we observe a unidirectional
causality from the local market to London.
Our results confirm that the development of the London market is important for the local
equity markets in Central Europe and also, though to a somewhat lesser extent, the
development on the local markets influences the trading of the GDRs in London. It is
interesting to note that not only the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of no causality and
allows us to conclude that the lagged price changes on the other market are jointly20
different from zero, but also many of the coefficients for individual lagged changes are
highly significant (and, in line with expectations, they are virtually all positive: higher
price in London implies higher price on the local market and vice versa).
18 Indeed, in
some instances lagged changes on the other market retain explanatory power for the
returns on the other market for four or five days. This suggests that the markets are
fragmented, since if there was indeed only one integrated market with two trading venues
￿ local and London markets ￿ prices would adjust very quickly and we would not be able
to observe such a prolonged adjustment.
19
3.2.2 Results of Error-Correction Model Estimation
First we computed the basic statistics for the mispricing series: the difference between the
local price and the London price (which was converted to local currency). Taking the
simple average over the sample period for each stock yielded values between minus 4.4%
and plus 4.4%. If we then took the average over all stocks, the mispricing would be equal
to approximately zero; the positive and negative deviations would cancel out. This is not
surprising and suggests that there is a long-term parity relationship between the local and
London price. A better view of the magnitude of mispricing, however, is to examine the
absolute value of the price deviations, since it does not matter, from the arbitrage point of
                                                
18 Information on the individual coefficient estimates is presented in Table 7 in the Appendix.
19 The approach presented above, looking for causality and market interaction in prices when both are
expressed in a common currency (local or USD) basically assumes the arbitrage view of the problem:
prices expressed in a common currency should move together since otherwise arbitrage opportunities
would exist. The potential problem of this approach is that it introduces an additional source of variation,
the exchange rate, into the analysis. If one wanted to focus purely on the information-driven co-movements
in the two prices (information about the stock only), he or she might use the original time series, that is,
without putting them into one currency (and then assume that the exchange rate movements are  not
correlated with news relevant for the stock￿s value). In our case, though, this problem does not affect the
result. We have also estimated Granger causality also with the original GDR prices in USD and the21
view, in what direction the pricing difference occurs. Arbitrage can be executed in both
directions.
If we inspect the series of absolute value deviations, we see that the average mispricing
varies from 0.6% for Česk￿ Telecom to 5.4% for Polish KGH, with the average being
2.0%. There is a weak tendency for the stocks with higher market capitalization to have a
lower degree of mispricing. Overall, despite the fact that the two time series appear to be
reasonably close, there might be room for profitable arbitrage.
20
<Table 3 can be found in the Appendix>
We have seen both positive and negative average returns among the stocks in our sample,
with the average being slightly positive. For the ten stocks for which we have enough
observations prior to the GDR listing, we have computed the volatility of local returns
(volatility defined as the standard deviation) both prior to and after the GDR listing. In
our sample, for 7 out of 10 stocks volatility increased after the GDR listing. The three
markets under consideration were developing quite rapidly and the increase of volatility
might be caused simply by changes of volatility on the market level. We thus compared
the changes of volatility of the cross-listed stocks with the change of volatility of the
market indices by using the variation coefficients (details can be found in Table 8 in the
Appendix).  It also turns out that in relative terms the volatility of cross-listed stocks
increased: for 7 out of the 10 stocks, the variation coefficient either increased more or
                                                                                                                                                
conclusions on causality were virtually identical (even though the significance levels were higher and the
number of statistically significant parameters was lower).
20 We do not have precise estimates of transaction costs, but these declined dramatically over the past
several years. Fierce competition for order flow decreased the commissions for the most liquid securities to
several tens of basis points.22
decreased less than the volatility of the market index.
21 Overall, our data confirm the
findings of the previous studies we cited above, which suggest that the volatility of local
returns is higher after GDR listing.
Table 4 depicts the results of unit root tests. In the vast majority of cases we were unable
to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the price time series. This holds for prices
both on the local market and at the London Stock Exchange. On the other hand, when we
took first differences of the prices, we were able to reject the null hypothesis for almost
all series. We thus concluded that most prices are integrated of the order I(1). In fact, for
19 out of the 22 stocks in our sample, we were able to conclude that both local and
London prices are I(1). As for the remaining three stocks, for two of them we had already
rejected the null hypothesis for the original price time series (and thus concluded that it
was stationary) and for one stock ￿ Europejski Fundusz Leasingowy ￿ even the first
differences were not stationary. In this last case, though, the results were most likely
influenced by the low number of observations.
<Table 4 can be found in the Appendix>
With two time series, both I(1), we can test for their cointegration. The regression of one
price time series on another yields an estimate of the equilibrium relationship between the
two time series. The results confirm the expectation that the coefficient should be close to
one, that is, the two prices should be identical. The coefficients indeed do not differ from
one and are highly significant. We report only the results of the regression of the local
                                                
21 It should be noted that some of the cross listed stocks are members of the market indices we use as a
representation of the overall market. This, however, is not a problem in this case. The difference in
volatility changes between these stocks and the market index is simply due to the volatility of other stocks
that were not cross listed.23
price on the GDR price in Table 4, but the results of running the regression in the other
direction were almost identical. We conclude that in almost all cases the two price time
series are cointegrated with the cointegration coefficient (long-run equilibrium
relationship) being close to one.
The existence of two cointegrated time series allows us to estimate the error-correction
model. The results can be found in Table 5.
<Table 5 can be found in the Appendix>
Our results confirm the existence of an error-correction mechanism between the local and
London prices. The error term, the difference between the two prices, is significant in all
19 cases for the regression with GDR price change as the dependent variable and for 15
out of 19 cases with local price as the dependent variable.
22 This implies that the
existence of mispricing induces price changes that work to correct such mispricing.
The error-correction estimates also correspond to the above results of Granger causality,
which suggested that new information is realized on both markets and thus there is no
pure dominant-satellite market relationship. Here, both prices react to the pricing error
and the coefficients are similar in magnitude. In fact, the average of significant error-
correction coefficients amounted to 0.35 for the change of local price as dependent
variable and it stood at 0.50 for the change of GDR price as the dependent variable. Thus,
the error-correction mechanism appears to be roughly symmetric. While there are mostly
small differences between the coefficients for the two directions of error correction,
substantial differences exist between countries. In the case of the companies from the
                                                
22 We do not estimate the error-correction model for the 3 stocks for which we were not able to conclude
that both local and London prices are I(1).24
Czech Republic and Poland, the error-correction coefficients average out to
approximately one third, while Hungary￿s average coefficient is close to 60%.
The main conclusion we draw from the results of estimating the error-correction model is
that the local markets indeed react to the mispricing. Since the error-correction term was
significant in the vast majority of cases, this conclusion is rather strong.
4.  Cross-listed Security on a Fragmented Market
4.1. Model
Our model is based on the framework used by Domowitz et al. (1998), who examined
cross-listing in terms of its impact on order flow. Domowitz et al. argue that when price
information is freely available and the markets are integrated, cross-listing results in an
improvement of market quality. Cross-listing induces participation of foreign investors
who would otherwise not trade. Thus, liquidity improves, with the  positive effects of
lowered spreads and increased precision of public information; and these in turn increase
liquidity by attracting even more investors. If information linkages are very poor (the
markets are completely fragmented), cross-listing decreases liquidity and increases
volatility in the local market as diversion of informative order flow decreases the quality
of the domestic market. If information linkages are imperfect (the partial fragmentation
case), the overall result is unclear. Higher intermarket competition may decrease
domestic spreads, but order flow migration lowers domestic market liquidity and
increases price volatility.25
The problem that we would like to bring attention to is that cross-listing of securities
brings higher excess returns when the two markets are segmented, that is, if there are
some barriers to investment. Such markets, though, will also tend to be fragmented,
which induces the adverse effect of order flow migration. Also, errors in pricing between
the local and foreign markets emerge as a new source of local price volatility. It thus
appears that there will be a tendency for securities from fragmented markets to obtain
cross-listing, which induces the negative effects of increased local market volatility after
cross-listing.
While Domowitz et al. do not make the assumption of market integration or
fragmentation, but rather attempt to determine the degree of fragmentation from their
estimates, we assume that the markets are to some extent fragmented. We have two
reasons for making this assumption and thus focusing on and developing the intermediate
case between complete integration and complete fragmentation. First, the above estimates
of Granger causality and cointegration models suggest that our markets are indeed
fragmented. Second, since traders on the local market are unable to observe the London
order flow, it appears that complete integration is impossible.
23 In any case, if we
introduced coefficient restrictions, our model could accommodate complete integration as
well.
The focus on the partial fragmentation case allows us to add an important component into
the Domowitz et al. framework, the volatility induced by market fragmentation.
Intuitively, random shocks and the realization of information cause the price on the
                                                
23 It is interesting to note that Domowitz et al. (1998) faced virtually the same setup with their Mexican data
￿ foreign order flow was not observable either ￿ and their results were indeed consistent with partial
fragmentation.26
foreign market (in our case London) to be different from the price on the local market.
Investors, as well as market markers, observe this difference and react accordingly when
setting the quotes and making investment decisions. There thus exists another factor, the
difference of prices in the two markets, that influences returns and possibly increases
local market volatility. The importance of this factor will depend on the degree of
fragmentation of the two markets and on the significance of information realized on the
foreign market.
Also, formally our model starts from the Domowitz et al. (1998) framework.
24 Consider a
stock trading on local and foreign markets. Both domestic and foreign investors are
allowed to trade the stock on both markets.
25 The arrival of domestic and foreign
investors is governed by independent Poisson distributions. The combined arrival
intensity at the local market is denoted by θ. We assume that investors arrive
consecutively. Let xk denote the order of the trader k who arrived at the market at time tk.
The variable xk can take three values: +1 if the order is a buy, -1 if the order is a sell and
0 if the trader who arrived chose not to trade.
Following Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we assume unit trade size and we also assume
that the local price the trader faces is
pk(xk) = ￿k + sxk
                                                
24 Where possible, we retain the notation of the original Domowitz et al. (1998) paper to facilitate easy
comparison of the models.
25 This is satisfied for the three countries we consider.27
where s represents the order processing component of the spread and ￿k denotes the
expected value of the asset from the market-maker￿s point of view at the time tk (just
before order xk arrives). The development of the stock￿s expected value is governed by
￿k = ￿k-1 + λxk + α (fk-1 ￿  pk-1)
where λ measures the impact of a trade on the expected value of the asset. If informed
trading is possible, market makers will revise their expectation of the asset￿s value based
on the observed order flow. The variable f denotes the price of the stock on the foreign
market. We assume that the market makers observe prices on the foreign market, even
though they do not necessarily also observe the order flow on the foreign market. This
corresponds to the actual setup of our three markets and is the same as in Domowitz et al.
(1998). We add a second key part by assuming that the market makers react to the price
difference by revising their expectation of the asset value. The rationale behind this
assumption is that the market makers observe the different market valuation of the stock
on the foreign market and conjecture that at least part of the difference is due to the fact
that private information was realized on the foreign market. Thus, they adjust their
expectations.
26 Similar to Domowitz et al., we assume that the quotation function of
market markers is public information and thus their expectations can be inferred from the
quotes.
Investors arrive at the market and decide whether to trade and, if they trade, whether to
buy or sell the stock. They maximize their expected utility; we assume that their utility
function takes the mean-variance form. As in Domowitz et al. (1998), in order to model28
the diversification motives for trading, we assume that investors receive idiosyncratic
human capital income ht. At time t, the investor observes a private signal about the true
value of the stock, in terms of deviation from the public expected value, yt. His estimate
of the stock value is thus yt+￿t. Let ρ
2 denote the variance of this estimate. The investor
thus maximizes
uk = (￿k + yk + wk ￿ pk(xk))xk + E[hk] ￿ aρ
2xk
2  ￿ aσh
2
by choosing xt from {-1,0,1}. The term wt stands for ￿2cov(ht, vt), that is, the covariance
between the investor￿s human capital income and the stock￿s fundamental value. This
term captures the diversification benefits the investor yields from investing in the stock.
For an investor who arrives at the market, it might be optimal not to trade (set xt = 0). It
can be shown that the investor will not trade if  s + aρ
2 > |yt + wt|.
27 Let φ be the
probability that the investor will choose not to trade upon arrival: φ = Prob[xt = 0] =
Prob[s + aρ
2 > |yt + wt|].
At this point, we need to express the variance of price changes on the local market. The
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26 This assumption is justified by the results of Granger causality tests and error-correction model estimates,
which were presented above. The London market appears to be an important place in terms of realization of
information relevant for the value of the stocks.
27 See the Domowitz et al. (1998) study.29
We are, however, interested in the variance of close-to-close price changes. In order to
obtain it, we need to consider the overnight innovations on the local market ε ~ (0,σε
2).
28
Thus, using the properties of Poisson distribution and the assumption that the
innovations, pricing errors and local price changes are independent, the variance of the
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It is worth noting that it is the variance of mispricing that increases the local market
variance. The variance of f, the price on the foreign market, as such does not matter. This
can be seen from the fact that if the two prices ￿ on the foreign and local markets ￿ were
always the same, no additional source of volatility would exist.
Let  ∆p denote the change of the price on the local market and let ∆lf stand for the
difference between the domestic and foreign prices. We square these terms in order to
obtain a proxy for the variance of the local price and the variance of the pricing error,
respectively. The variance of the pricing error is used as an approximation of the term








j j p f σ α , which is not observable in the data. We estimate the model
(∆pt)
2 = γ0 + γ1 GDRt + β0(∆pt-1)
2 + β1(∆pt-1)
2GDRt +
+ λ0VOLt + λ1VOLtGDRt + α (∆lft)
 2 + e t        (7)
where GDRt equals 1 after GDR listing and 0 otherwise. It is worth repeating that the
coefficient  α denotes the impact of the pricing errors. Coefficients γ,  β and λ with
                                                
28 The overnight innovations on the foreign market impact only the variable f and not p directly (foreign30
subscript 0 denote the baseline volatility, volatility persistence and the impact of trading
volume, respectively, prior to GDR listing. The same coefficients with subscript 1
measure the change in the original coefficients due to GDR listing. As mentioned above,
we are able to estimate this full model only for 10 out of the 22 stocks. For the other 12
stocks, we estimate a simplified model, that is, the model specified in (7) without the
GDR terms.
When estimating model (7), we encountered the endogeneity problem. The variable
(∆lft)
2, which equals (ft ￿ pt)
2, contains the current value of the local price and, since the
dependent variable is (∆pt)
2 = (pt ￿ pt-1)
 2, the variable (∆lft)
2 is correlated with the error
term e t. One can solve the problem by using instrumental variables, variables that are
correlated with the problem variable (here (∆lft)
2) but are not correlated with the error
term. We use the variance of the foreign index (FTSE 100) as an instrumental variable
here. It is correlated with the variance of the pricing error, but it is not correlated with the
error term. In is worth noting that the index FTSE 100 does not measure the development
on the SEAQ International segment of the London Stock Exchange, but rather includes
the most important U.K. stocks. In fact, it would be very difficult to argue that the FTSE
100 index is influenced by price changes of emerging market companies from Central
Europe, which makes it a good instrument. We also use lagged value of the price error
variance as the second instrument for the current pricing-error variance. As for the
estimation method, the relatively large number of observations allows us to use the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator with the above mentioned
                                                                                                                                                
innovations impact the local price only through the market-maker￿s reaction to the pricing difference).31
instruments. Standard errors were computed from a heteroscedastic-consistent matrix
(White), also robust to first-order autocorrelation.
4.2. Estimation Results
Our results confirm that the mispricing, or more precisely its variance, is an important
determinant of the local return variance. The results thus lend support to our model,
which assumed that the two markets are fragmented and that investors take into account
the mispricing when updating their beliefs about the fundamental price of the stock.
In half of the cases, the coefficient alpha, which captures the effect of the pricing error
volatility, is significant at the 5% level.
<Table 6 can be found in the Appendix>
The baseline volatility estimates are significant and positive, which is in line with
expectations. There is some evidence that it diminishes as the result of the GDR listing.
We also find a significant and positive effect of volume, which is in line with both the
predictions of our model and with the findings of Domowitz et al. (1998). One might
argue that the effect of volume tends to diminish after the GDR listing, but the evidence
is not very strong as there are also significant positive coefficients. Also, the first-order
autocorrelation term is significant and positive, which implies that higher variance
observations tend to be clustered. It does not change after the listing of the GDRs. The
coefficient of determination varies from just 1% to as high as 69%. On average, the
model explains 17% of local stock price variance.32
5.  Conclusion
The current paper investigates the information flows between cross-listed stocks by using
a sample of securities from Central Europe. We focus on one of the potential problems
arising from cross-listing of securities: increased variance of the local market returns after
the shares are cross-listed abroad. Earlier studies attempted to explain this increased
variance by order flow migration and higher baseline volatility of returns. We extend an
earlier model to include another factor influencing local return variance: the pricing
errors between the local and foreign markets. The excess returns and thus incentives to
cross-list securities tend to be higher in the case of segmented markets, in other words,
when cross-listing overcomes existing barriers. This, however, suggests that the local and
foreign markets, on which the cross-listed securities are traded, are unlikely to be
integrated and pricing errors might be substantial.
As the first step of our analysis, we use a Granger causality and cointegration framework
to examine the information flows and co-movements between the markets. We found that
substantial information flows exist between the local and London markets. The markets
appear to be fragmented, since we found systematic causality patterns in daily data.
Moreover, these patterns persisted over several days. The two time series of prices are
cointegrated and estimation of an error-correction model suggests that arbitrage works in
both directions to correct any pricing errors. The relationship between the local and
London markets appears to be rather symmetric in terms of the error-correction
mechanism. As for the Granger causality, we found that it runs in both directions, but the
London market appears to be slightly more important, at least in terms of the number of
companies for which the null hypothesis of no causality was rejected.33
Estimation of the sources of variance on the local market lends support to our model,
which assumes that the investors watch and react to the difference between the local and
London prices. We have thus identified another factor that needs to be considered when
considering cross-listing shares abroad in an emerging market environment: the increased
variance of returns that is induced by the fragmentation of the market. Our findings help
explain the increased variance of returns that was reported previously.34
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Appendix
Table 1: Basic Characteristics of Cross-Listed Stocks










ČeskØ radiokomunikace 1 Czech
Republic





Telecom 6,123 1,342 571
Komerčn￿ banka 3 Czech
Republic
Banking 860 1,571 787
Borsodchem 4 Hungary Chemicals 381 1,145 1,170
Graboplast 5 Hungary Miscellaneous 45 1,288 734
MATAV 6 Hungary Telecom 6,631 714 714
MOL 7 Hungary Oil/Integrated 1,558 1,227 1,227
Pick Szeged 8 Hungary Food/Meat 112 1,288 605
Synergon 9 Hungary Computers 65 331 338
Tiszai Vegyi Kombinat 10 Hungary Petrochemicals 392 1,047 1,063
Zalakeramia
Reszvenytarsasag
11 Hungary Ceramic Products 32 1,286 851
OTP Bank 12 Hungary Banking 1,410 1,288 1,304
Gedeon Richter 13 Hungary Medical/Drugs 971 1,288 1,238
Agora 14 Poland Media/Publishing 1,403 342 382
Big Bank Gdanski 15 Poland Banking 923 1,723 792
Europejski Fundusz
Leasingowy
16 Poland Leasing 195 67 105
KGHM Polska Miedz 17 Poland Metal/Diversified 1,478 803 805
Kredyt Bank PBI 18 Poland Banking 389 1,578 694
Mostostal Warszava 19 Poland Construction 31 1,723 585
Powszechny Bank
Kredytowy
20 Poland Banking 560 732 298
Prokom Software 21 Poland Software 543 652 698
Telekomunikacja Polska 22 Poland Telecom 9,867 451 458
Sources: Bloomberg, company Web pages, own calculation. Note: The samples start as the stocks have
been introduced to the local capital market (or as the GDRs were listed in London). The initial public
offering date ranges from June 1993 to March 2000. The sample ends at the beginning of August 2000.37














1 Local price 11.56 
a Yes No 568 0.07
GDR price 1.63 568 0.02
2 Local price 1.10 No Yes 558 0.02
GDR price 14.18
 a 558 0.12
3 Local price 4.40
 a Yes Yes 763 0.08
GDR price 12.90
 a 763 0.09
4 Local price 10.08
 a Yes Yes 855 0.05
GDR price 7.02
 a 855 0.04
5 Local price 1.38 No Yes 632 0.02
GDR price 11.65
 a 632 0.07
6 Local price 18.10
 a Yes Yes 601 0.12
GDR price 3.01
 b 601 0.03
7 Local price 15.83
 a Yes Yes 920 0.08
GDR price 2.72
 b 920 0.02
8 Local price 9.32
 a Yes Yes 567 0.04
GDR price 42.85
 a 567 0.16
9 Local price 10.34
 a Yes Yes 314 0.14
GDR price 3.70
 a 314 0.16
10 Local price 5.16
 a Yes Yes 763 0.02
GDR price 11.73
 a 763 0.06
11 Local price 6.43
 a Yes Yes 660 0.06
GDR price 14.75
 a 660 0.10
12 Local price 14.97
 a Yes No 980 0.06
GDR price 1.48 980 0.02
13 Local price 18.22
 a Yes Yes 931 0.12
GDR price 4.81
 a 931 0.05
14 Local price 7.51
 a Yes No 335 0.05
GDR price 0.90 335 0.02
15 Local price 40.66 
a Yes No 694 0.20
GDR price 0.82 694 0.05
16 Local price 2.79
 b Yes Yes 60 0.40
GDR price 2.94
 b 60 0.38
17 Local price 58.8
 a Yes No 713 0.20
GDR price 1.67 713 0.02
18 Local price 34.92
 a Yes No 953 0.19
GDR price 0.83 953 0.03
19 Local price 6.43
 a Yes Yes 556 0.04
GDR price 11.71
 a 556 0.11
20 Local price 6.79
 a Yes Yes 285 0.14
GDR price 2.75
 b 285 0.10
21 Local price 19.53
 a Yes No 623 0.09
GDR price 1.23 623 0.02
22 Local price 29.76
 a Yes No 431 0.28
GDR price 1.76 431 0.03
Note: 
a denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance, while 
b denotes rejection at
the 5% significance level.38



























































1 1,240 380 1,249 367 17 1.4% 0.0025 0.0299 0.0023 0.0238
2 554 127 554 127 3 0.6% 0.0011 0.0229 0.0008 0.0160
3 866 382 904 416 42 4.9% -0.0004 0.0388 0.0006 0.0191
4 6,275 2,301 6,270 2,282 63 1.0% 0.0017 0.0303 ￿ ￿
5 3,859 3,179 3,876 3,183 110 2.8% -0.0014 0.0399 0.0040 0.0205
6 1,438 393 1,437 394 11 0.8% 0.0012 0.0247 ￿ ￿
7 4,187 1,702 4,190 1,692 38 0.9% 0.0014 0.0281 ￿ ￿
8 9,431 2,097 9,438 2,089 113 1.2% 0.0000 0.0359 0.0013 0.0263
9 2,740 503 2,740 506 35 1.3% -0.0014 0.0340 ￿ ￿
10 3,310 1,061 3,308 1,058 40 1.2% 0.0014 0.0336 ￿ ￿
11 4,654 3,260 4,645 3,254 89 1.9% -0.0009 0.0380 0.0022 0.0164
12 7,537 4,643 7,535 4,625 72 1.0% 0.0025 0.0311 ￿ ￿
13 12,448 5,733 12,457 5,699 118 0.9% 0.0022 0.0343 ￿ ￿
14 77 38 76 37 1 1.7% 0.0032 0.0350 ￿ ￿
15 7 4 7 3 0 2.4% 0.0017 0.0397 0.0000 0.0317
16 144 6 137 8 6 4.4% -0.0014 0.0206 ￿ ￿
17 20 7 21 8 1 5.4% 0.0011 0.0340 ￿ ￿
18 15 3 15 3 0 2.0% 0.0013 0.0293 -0.0003 0.0356
19 19 4 19 4 1 3.6% -0.0008 0.0279 0.0007 0.0416
20 93 10 92 10 2 1.9% 0.0009 0.0258 -0.0003 0.0308
21 144 45 143 44 3 2.4% 0.0016 0.0367 ￿ ￿
22 27 6 27 6 0 1.5% 0.0016 0.0280 ￿ ￿39






















1I (1) I(1) 1.03 -4.57
a
t-statistics -2.85 -2.74 -12.87 
a -12.51
a 345.9
2I (1) I(1) 1.00 -12.09
a
t-statistics -2.46 -2.41 -15.33
a -15.58
a 656.7
3I (1) I(1) 0.91 -4.19
b
t-statistics -1.87 -1.96 -14.17
a -13.32
a 219.3
4I (1) I(1) 1.01 -12.26
a
t-statistics -2.07 -2.16 -23.13
a -21.5
a 920.8
5I (1) I(1) 1.00 -4.59
a
t-statistics -1.50 -3.20 -15.13
a -14.56
a 537.0
6I (1) I(1) 1.00 -6.59
a
t-statistics -2.32 -2.35 -18.2
a -17.1
a 638.6
7I (1) I(1) 1.01 -8.27
a
t-statistics -1.31 -1.31 -20.9
a -21.58
a 1,086.3
8I (1) I(1) 1.00 -9.80
a
t-statistics -2.19 -2.85 -14.02
a -11.56
a 309.7
9I (1) I(1) 0.99 -4.86
a
t-statistics -1.55 -1.21 -9.25
a -12.21
a 180
10 I(1) I(1) 1.00 -4.87
a
t-statistics -1.97 -1.83 -22.52
a -20.71
a 538.6
11 I(1) I(1) 1.00 -4.56
a
t-statistics -1.40 -1.56 -16.6
a -12.60
a 726.3






13 I(1) I(1) 1.01 -6.00
a
t-statistics -1.65 -2.26 -20.74
a -20.46
a 1,137.7
14 I(1) I(1) 1.01 -6.46
a
t-statistics -1.83 -2.05 -12.36
a -12.2
a 412.6
15 I(1) I(1) 1.01 -8.35
a
t-statistics -2.66 -2.18 -19.45
a -19.57
a 420.4
16 I(2) I(1) 0.52 -3.35
t-statistics -2.06 -2.31 -3.38 -4.6
a 8.9
17 I(1) I(1) 0.87 -3.92
b
t-statistics -2.27 -2.66 -18.25
a -15.82
a 167.3
18 I(0) I(1) 0.97 -4.55
a
t-statistics -4.24
 a -3.07 -23.99
a -16.46
a 201.7
19 I(1) I(1) 0.89 -4.90
a
t-statistics -1.69 -2.28 -24.88
a -12.74
a 105.6
20 I(1) I(1) 0.97 -2.41
a
t-statistics -3.20 -2.61 -16.33
a -11.45
a 65.2
21 I(1) I(1) 1.00 -4.47
a
t-statistics -2.15 -2.17 -18.4
a -17.46
a 215.2
22 I(1) I(1) 1.00 -10.72
a




a denotes rejection of the null hypothesis (of a unit root in the case of an augmented Dickey Fuller
test and of equality to zero in the case of the cointegration coefficient) at the 1% level of significance, while
b denotes rejection at the 5% significance level. *local price as the dependent variable (coefficient) **local
price as the dependent variable (test statistics for residuals from the cointegration regression).40
Table 5: Error Correction Model



















1 -4.15 2.24 0.27
 a -3.75 504 0.69 2.26
a 1.04
a 0.24
 a 0.02 505 0.79
t-statistics -1.08 1.33 2.81 -0.75 2.84 16.70 5.36 1.91
20 . 0 5 0.39
 b 0.33
 c 1.02













t-statistics -3.47 4.48 2.87 1.20 2.56 12.18 2.78 2.84
4 3.24 0.20 0.28
 b 0.74




t-statistics 0.86 0.96 2.11 3.50 -0.86 31.33 20.74 5.17




t-statistics -0.20 0.37 0.57 0.00 0.91 9.33 7.46 3.58
60 . 7 7 0.43
 a 0.40
 a 0.10




t-statistics 1.25 3.50 3.99 4.26 -1.33 29.07 15.84 5.05
7 -3.25 0.18 0.36
 a 0.54





t-statistics -1.68 1.17 4.44 5.20 1.75 30.28 15.78 5.75




t-statistics -1.04 0.85 1.46 1.37 1.32 20.05 9.05 2.17
9 -0.73 1.05
 a 0.85
 a -0.01 300 0.77 0.84 1.03
a 0.84
 a 0.00 300 0.77
t-statistics -0.29 5.11 6.51 -0.15 0.32 6.99 5.86 0.00
10 -0.57 -0.15 -0.01 0.62




t-statistics -0.20 -0.46 -0.03 3.44 -0.15 19.46 7.34 4.82






















t-statistics 3.84 7.01 5.62 1.82 -3.63 5.96 6.37 1.69
15 0.03
 c 0.03 0.35















t-statistics -1.86 3.14 3.18 4.94 2.03 9.23 3.06 5.87
19 0.04 1.01
 a 0.19
 a 0.00 515 0.26 -0.03 0.92
a 0.17
 a 0.00 519 0.23




 a 0.00 264 0.59 -0.26
b 1.19
a 0.26
 a 0.00 265 0.57
t-statistics 1.70 5.95 3.99 -0.38 -2.00 4.70 2.99 -0.71
21 0.10 0.84
 a 0.21














t-statistics 3.95 5.99 16.05 2.71 -2.58 7.73 6.39 2.97
Note: 
a  denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero at the 1% level of
significance, while 
b and 
c denote rejection at the 5% and 10% significance levels.41





































































































































































































































































































































Note: Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates, with instruments (FTSE 100 and lagged error
terms) for contemporaneous pricing errors. Standard errors were computed from a heteroscedasticity-
consistent matrix (White), also robust to first-order autocorrelation.  
a  denotes rejection of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero at the 1% level of significance,  
b 5% significance level and 
c
10% significance level.42
Table 7: Individual Coefficient Estimates for Granger causality (t-statistics below
coefficient estimates)








-2.83 -3.23 -2.20 ￿ ￿ ￿ 5.18 3.97 2.26 ￿ ￿ ￿
GDR 0.10 -0.08 -0.05 ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.09 0.15
 b 0.00 ￿ ￿ ￿
1.46 -1.14 -0.80 ￿ ￿ ￿ -1.41 2.09 0.05 ￿ ￿ ￿
2 Local 0.11 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.17 ￿ -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.12 ￿









 b -0.03 ￿
8.05 3.84 3.26 2.03 -0.24 ￿ -7.35 -3.60 -3.55 -2.11 -0.32 ￿
3 Local 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.21
 a 0.05 -0.02 ￿ ￿ ￿













 a ￿ ￿ 0.39
 a 0.25
 a 0.12 0.28
 a ￿￿
-4.33 -2.54 -2.41 -3.96 ￿ ￿ 5.38 2.98 1.50 3.96 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.29
 a 0.25
 a 0.11 -0.15
 b ￿￿ - 0 . 2 5
 a -0.21
 b -0.20
 b 0.14 ￿ ￿
3.88 2.91 1.32 -2.04 ￿ ￿ -3.41 -2.52 -2.31 1.89 ￿ ￿
5 Local -0.07 0.02 -0.04 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.01 0.09
 b 0.02 ￿ ￿ ￿


















-6.29 -5.40 -5.33 -3.78 ￿ ￿ 7.87 5.85 4.77 3.87 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.13 -0.03 -0.26
 b -0.17
 c ￿ ￿ -0.03 0.03 0.21
 b 0.13 ￿ ￿










-6.30 -3.74 -4.06 -2.34 ￿ ￿ 7.91 4.27 3.13 1.80 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.20
 a 0.14
 c -0.02 0.05 ￿ ￿ -0.14
 b -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 ￿ ￿
2.85 1.81 -0.22 0.68 ￿ ￿ -2.02 -1.45 -0.86 -1.48 ￿ ￿
8 Local 0.11 0.33
 a ￿￿￿￿ - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 3 5
 a ￿￿￿￿
1 . 6 1 4 . 5 2 ￿￿￿￿ - 0 . 7 8 - 4 . 3 1 ￿￿￿￿
GDR 0.45
 a 0.38
 a ￿￿￿￿ - 0 . 3 2
 a -0.41
 a ￿￿￿￿
8 . 1 1 6 . 7 4 ￿￿￿￿ - 4 . 6 9 - 6 . 3 6 ￿￿￿￿
9 Local -0.36
 a -0.28
 b -0.09 -0.05 ￿ ￿ 0.65
 a 0.08 0.30
 a -0.20
 c ￿￿
-3.39 -2.19 -0.70 -0.50 ￿ ￿ 5.47 0.63 2.34 -1.83 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.35
 a 0.18 0.13 0.02 ￿ ￿ 0.00 -0.33
 a 0.08 -0.21
 b ￿￿
3.76 1.57 1.22 0.22 ￿ ￿ -0.02 -2.79 0.74 -2.19 ￿ ￿
10 Local -0.16
 b -0.09 0.03 0.09 ￿ ￿ 0.17
 b 0.12
 c -0.08 -0.16
 b ￿￿



















-3.47 -2.35 -4.00 -0.53 ￿ ￿ 4.23 3.63 1.99 2.49 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.36
 a 0.31
 a 0.07 0.11
 c ￿￿ - 0 . 2 2
 a -0.24
 a -0.11
 c 0.02 ￿ ￿










-6.22 -3.11 -2.92 -2.32 ￿ ￿ 7.66 3.76 2.14 1.78 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.08 0.16
 b 0.02 -0.02 ￿ ￿ 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 ￿ ￿










-5.06 -3.33 -5.53 -4.87 ￿ ￿ 8.03 4.25 4.44 4.11 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.14
 c 0.14 -0.16
 c -0.17
 b ￿ ￿ 0.05 -0.11 0.09 0.13
 c ￿￿
1.73 1.60 -1.84 -2.21 ￿ ￿ 0.67 -1.23 1.01 1.66 ￿ ￿
14 Local -0.27
 a - 0 . 1 1 ￿￿￿￿ 0 . 3 5
 a 0.23
 b ￿￿￿￿
- 2 . 7 2 - 1 . 1 5 ￿￿￿￿ 3 . 6 4 2 . 3 5 ￿￿￿￿
G D R 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 1 ￿￿￿￿ - 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 3 ￿￿￿￿










-7.84 -4.74 -5.79 -2.04 ￿ ￿ 12.15 4.74 5.06 5.81 ￿ ￿
GDR 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.07 ￿ ￿ 0.10
 c -0.02 -0.09 0.13 ￿ ￿
0.70 0.86 -0.36 1.20 ￿ ￿ 1.90 -0.30 -1.50 2.22 ￿ ￿
16 Local 0.13 -0.15 0.34
 b 0.13 -0.24 -0.02 0.29
 c -0.07 0.12 -0.38
 a 0.10 0.15
0.80 -0.87 2.11 0.79 -1.56 -0.15 1.97 -0.50 0.87 -2.82 0.60 1.01
GDR 0.06 -0.14 0.46
 a 0.22 -0.07 -0.21
 c 0.31
 c 0.06 -0.09 -0.38
 a 0.18 0.23








-9.14 -4.31 -3.16 ￿ ￿ ￿ 12.93 5.31 2.93 ￿ ￿ ￿
GDR -0.11
 b 0.00 -0.03 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.16
 a 0.04 -0.02 ￿ ￿ ￿










-6.17 -5.16 -3.49 -2.68 ￿ ￿ 11.23 6.00 3.03 4.19 ￿ ￿
GDR -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 ￿ ￿ 0.05 0.16
 b 0.00 0.16
 a ￿￿
-0.20 -1.46 -1.39 -0.87 ￿ ￿ 0.95 2.55 -0.02 2.70 ￿ ￿
19 Local -0.06 -0.01 0.00 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.24
 a 0.09 -0.07 ￿ ￿ ￿
-1.16 -0.11 0.01 ￿ ￿ ￿ 3.94 1.52 -1.24 ￿ ￿ ￿
GDR 0.21
 a 0.13
 a 0.02 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.05 0.01 -0.12
 a ￿￿￿




 b -0.05 -0.23
 a ￿0 . 5 0
 a 0.32
 a 0.22
 b 0.02 0.19
 c ￿
-2.83 -3.80 -2.13 -0.48 -2.49 ￿ 5.18 3.02 2.02 0.16 1.90 ￿
GDR 0.23
 a -0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.17
 b ￿ 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.17
 c ￿
2.61 -0.50 0.43 0.12 -2.01 ￿ 0.66 -0.27 -0.63 -0.75 1.87 ￿
21 Local -0.28
 a -0.29
 a -0.10 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.36
 a 0.41
 a 0.06 ￿ ￿ ￿
-4.46 -4.47 -1.53 ￿ ￿ ￿ 5.86 6.18 0.85 ￿ ￿ ￿
GDR 0.12
 c 0.01 0.03 ￿ ￿ ￿ -0.05 0.09 -0.08 ￿ ￿ ￿











-7.55 -7.66 -4.35 -3.52 -1.56 ￿ 11.79 6.87 5.41 3.90 1.66 ￿
GDR 0.15
 c 0.01 0.19
 b 0.03 0.04 ￿ -0.04 -0.01 -0.18
 b -0.09 -0.08 ￿
1.83 0.07 2.03 0.28 0.52 ￿ -0.57 -0.17 -2.03 -0.95 -0.94 ￿
Note: 
a  denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero at the 1% level of
significance and  
b at the 5% significance level. LOC denotes the price on the local market, while LI stands
for the GDR price in London.44



























1 349.8 106.9 0.31 1240.4 380.1 0.31
2 339.4 57.7 0.17 554.0 126.8 0.23
3 1,930.3 371.3 0.19 866.0 381.6 0.44
5 5,522.3 3,374.7 0.61 3,858.7 3,179.3 0.82
8 9,961.7 3,615.9 0.36 9,431.2 2,096.6 0.22
11 5,845.9 1,842.6 0.32 4,653.5 3,259.9 0.70
15 2.6 1.1 0.43 6.7 3.5 0.53
18 8.3 2.0 0.24 15.1 3.1 0.21
19 15.2 8.4 0.55 18.8 3.7 0.19































1 505.58 48.75 0.10 479.06 85.02 0.18
2 505.14 48.77 0.10 479.33 85.45 0.18
3 507.40 54.29 0.11 484.97 75.05 0.15
5 4,048.3 2,054.5 0.51 7,412.3 1,435.4 0.19
8 4,723.2 2,365.5 0.50 7,342.9 1,531.1 0.21
11 3,197.0 1,353.6 0.42 7,375.0 1,361.2 0.18
15 1,127.2 351.7 0.31 1,623.8 309.9 0.19
18 1,189.3 370.3 0.31 1,624.4 327.6 0.20
19 1,232.0 383.9 0.31 1,617.1 345.8 0.21























Note: Variation coefficient is defined as the standard deviation over the average of a random variable. We
used the same indices that are described in the text above as an approximation of the market indices: PX50
for the Czech market, BUX for Hungary and WIG for Poland.